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Part I
Introduction
1
On June 3, 1979, the exploratory oil well Ixtoc I blew out.

The well, which is located about fifty miles off the Yucatan peninsula in the Gulf of Mexico's Bay of Campeche, had spewed, according to official Mexican estimates, about 3.1 million barrels of oil into
the sea when it was capped on March 24, 1980.2
The well was drilled by Perforaciones Marinas del Golfo S.A.
(PEMARGO), a private Mexican drilling firm, under a contract with
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the state-owned Mexican national oil

by
company. 3 The rig itself, Sedco 135, was leased to PEMARGO
4
Sedco, the world's largest independent oil drilling firm.
The oil spill resulting from the Ixtoc I blowout became the
worst such incident in history, dumping more than twice as much
oil into the ocean as had the worst previous such disaster, the wreck
of the supertanker Amoco Cadiz off the French coast on March 16,
1978. 5 Yet the Ixtoc I blowout (hereinafter referred to as the
Mexican Oil Spill) was only the most recent incident in a chain of
serious oil polluting accidents resulting from well blowouts, not
to mention oil spills resulting from supertanker crashes, 6 accidents
which, as a whole, constitute a serious threat to the ocean's
environment.

1.
NY. Times, June 9,1979, at Al, col. 1.
2.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1980, at Al, col. 1. A number of unofficial
estimates put the amount of oil at between three and four times what the
Mexican government claims that the well discharged, or between nine and
twelve million barrels. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1980, at D18, col. 1.
3.
See Oil & GasJ., Oct. 29,1979,at 71.
4.
Id.
5.
See O'Sullivan, The Amoco Cadiz Oil Spill, 9 Marine Pollution
Bull. 123 (1978), for an account of the Amoco Cadiz accident, which spilled
200,000 tons of oil into the ocean, see also the following issues of the New
York Times: Mar. 21, 1978, at A3, col. 4; Mar. 22, 1978, at A6, col. 1; Mar.
23, 1978, at A2, col. 3; Mar. 24, 1978, at A6, col. 3; Mar. 25, 1978, at A8, col.
1; Mar. 26, 1978, at A8, col. 3; Mar. 27, 1978, at A10, col. 3; and Mar. 28,
1978, at A9, col. 2.
6.
The last such accident, involving two supertankers carrying a combined cargo of nearly 3.3 million barrels of oil, occurred off the costs of
Trinidad and Tobago. See N.Y. Times,July 22, 1979, at Al, col. 2.
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The first serious blowout, the Santa Barbara Channel accident
off the coast of California, happened on January 28, 1969, 7 only
two years after the Torrey Canyon disaster 8 which was the first
spill resulting from a supertanker accident. In the thirteen-month
period following the Santa Barbara Channel accident, at least three9
blowouts were reported to have occurred in the Gulf of Mexico.
The most publicized incident resulted from the explosion of a
platform belonging to Chevron Oil on February 10, 1969.10 It
spewed out about 12,000 barrels of oil and was called by the Oil
& Gas Journal the largest oil spill in United States history;1 1 the
giant oil slicks that resulted were a serious threat to the Louisiana
12
coastline.
Only one blowout to date, the Ekofisk well blowout of April
22, 1977, has occurred in the North Sea. This well, however, was
capped before it caused serious damage. 1 3 According to a spokes14
man of PEMEX, two other offshore wells have blown out recently.
They were brought under control within 48 hours,
but it was con15
ceded that more accidents were likely to occur.
These incidents and the many oil catastrophes resulting from
16
vessel source pollution, of which no special mention will be made,
serve as grim reminders and strong indicators of the seriousness of
the oil pollution threat to the world's oceans. These incidents can
be considered the undesirable byproducts and side effects of the
generally beneficial undertaking of offshore oil exploration and
exploitation. The tremendous increase in offshore oil production

7.
See Utton, A Survey of National Laws on the Control of Pollution
from Oil and Gas Operations on the ContinentalShelf, 9 Colum. J. Transnat'l

L. 331 (1970).
8.
See Nanda, The "'orrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects,
44 Den. LJ.400 (1967); E. Cowan, The Torrey Canyon Disaster (1968).
9.
For an account of these blowouts, see Oil & Gas J., Mar. 31, 1969,
at 40; Oil & Gas J.,Jan. 19,1970, at 23.
10. Oil & Gas J., Feb. 16, 1970, at 43. See also, Oil & GasJ., Feb. 23,
1970, at 65; Mar. 2, 1970, at 41.
11. Oil & Gas J., Apr. 6, 1970, at 78.
12. Id.
13. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 24,1977, at A1, col. 5.
14. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1979, at A2, col. 3.
15. Id., according to a spokesman for PEMEX.
16. As the title indicates, this paper will be mainly concerned with oil
pollution damage resulting from offshore activities. Mention of vessel source
pollution will be made only if it is deemed pertinent for the present paper.

N.YJ. Int'l & Comp. L.

[Vol. Il

since World War II, namely from literally none in 1953 to some
twenty percent of the world's oil production in 1975,17 is due to
the increase in the world's need for oil.
As a consequence of this, the technology needed for exploiting offshore oil reserves has made a tremendous step forward. Exploration holes for petroleum have been drilled in water depths exceeding 650 meters (2100 feet) and production has been established
18
in water depths of more than 125 meters (about 400 feet).
The still growing need for energy will further encourage offshore activities which can be classified as oneof the
[m] any large-scale enterprises operating on the

frontiers of science and technology [which] engage in operations having a high degree of cost
and risk. They all illustrate how some of the
emerging scientific uses of what the ocean has
to offer, which are generally thought of as
justified by man's Scriptural mandate to exercise
mastery over nature for the general benefit, may
greatly threaten the environment and bring
waste, poverty and misery in their train. 19
The lamentable success of coastal states' efforts toward the
implementation of the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone
[hereinafter referred to as EEZ] in the negotiations of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Seas [hereinafter
cited as UNCLOS 1II 20 will be another incentive for the promotion
of new offshore technology.
The search for offshore oil and gas reserves and the exploitation thereof is are expected to continue with unabated intensity
for at least the next two decades. 2 1 The magnitude of the offshore
17.

(1978).
18.

C. Drake, J. Imbrie, J. Knauss & K. Turekian, Oceanographic 387

Id. at 391.

19. Goldie, International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution,
9 Colum. J. Transnatl L. 283, 284 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Goldie, Responsibility for Pollution].
20. See Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text),

Aug. 28, 1980, Documents of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 3/Add. 1 (1980) [herinafter referred to as I.C.N.T.], art. 55 et seq., particularly arts. 56 and 57; see
also art. 77 with regard to coastal states' rights over the continental shelf.
21. See Jackson, Offshore Pollution, in 1975 Conference on the pre-
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production development will unavoidably result in a considerable
increase in marine oil pollution. This is also revealed by the President's Panel on Oil Spills which reported that by 1980, 3000 to
4000 wells will be drilled annually and that "we
expect to have a
22
major pollution incident somewhere every year."
The above mentioned incidents and the foregoing statistics
greatly underscore the potential threat. The total annual influx
of oil to the ocean is estimated to be between five and ten million
tons. 23 The primary effects of oil spills in previously uncontaminated areas are well known since all large oil spills to date have occurred fairly near shore: 2 4 oil covered beaches; the subsequent
reduction of the recreational value of the environment;,and, due
to the immediate toxicity of oil, the poisoning or, depending on
the gravity of contamination, even the total destruction of a large
range of marine species, 25 are all possible results of oil spills. The
$1.3 billion damage suit filed against the operators of the faulty
Santa Barbara well 2 6 and the more than $350 million worth of
claims pending against Sedco, the Texas firm which supplied the
Ixtoc I drilling platform, 2 7 might give a more vivid picture of the
damage to be expected as a result of oil spills from well blowouts.
This brief outline was intended to point out the potentiality
and magnitude of risk arising from offshore oil operations and to
underscore the need for effective regulatory safeguards with respect
to the prevention and control of oil pollution resulting from the

vention and Control of Oil Pollution 3 (1975). See also OEED, Environmental
Impacts From Offshore Exploration and Production of Oil and Gas 3 (1977),
for a recent forecast range of offshore oil production in the North Sea in the
decade of 1975-1985.
22. President's Panel on Oil Spills (2nd Report), Offshore Mineral
Resources, Challenge and Opportunity 3 (1969).
23.
Blumer, Scientific Aspects of the Oil Spill Problem, in Oceanographic, Contemporary Readings in Ocean Science 323 (R. Pririe, ed. 2d ed.,
1977).
24. See Revelle, Wenk, Ketchum & Corino Ocean Pollution by Petroleum Hydrocarbons, in Man's Impact on Terrestrial and Ocean Ecosystem
298 (1971).
25. Id. at 307; see also Blumer, supra note 23, at 322, for a more detailed and scientific evaluation of primary and long-term effects of marine
oil pollution.
26. See 10 Harv. Int' LJ. 316, at 320 n. 26 (1969).
27. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1979, at A12, col. 1; Oil & Gas J., Oct.
29, 1979, at 71.
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exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf as well as
the need for regulations ensuring the compensation for transjurisYet, except for one regional
dictional 2 8 oil pollution damage.
agreement which is not yet in force, 2 9 there is no international
conventional regime governing the liability for offshore oil polluas yet been any international law case dealing
tion, nor has there
30
with the problem.
Due to the absence of international regulation and of leading
international law cases dealing with the issue of offshore oil pollution, much uncertainty and vagueness prevails with regard to legal
aspects of the problem. It is also plain that the oil pollution resulting from offshore activities is really a problem which can be dealt
effectively only by means of a unified internawith reasonably and
31
tional legal regime.
This article shall be concerned with only one of the many
legal aspects of oil pollution resulting from the exploration and
exploitation operations on the continental shelf, namely, with the
question' of whether or not states under whose jurisdiction such
operations are carried out are responsible for transjurisdictional
damage resulting from such activities, and, if they are responsible,
to what degree are they so held. So far, there have been some
attempts to approach the subject on a general basis; yet they have
28. This expression has been chosen because offshore activities are
often carried on in areas which are no longer subject to the unlimited jurisdiction a nation may exercise within its frontiers but are within the limited jurisdiction of coastal states for the purposes of exploration and exploitation on
the continental shelf. In this sense, "transjurisdictional" is broader in scope
than "transnational."
29. This is the 1976 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage from Offshore Operations, opened for signature May 1, 1977, to April
30, 1978 [hereinafter cited as the Offshore Liability Convention] ; text with
final act in Bock, Ruster & Simma, XIX International Protection of the Environment, Treaties and Related Documents 9538 (1975-1979). The convention
covers offshore operations carried out in the North Sea. Signatories to the Final
Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Convention are Belgium,
Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The convention is intended to
remain regional, but art. 18 provides that other states "which have coastlines on
the North Sea, the Baltic Sea or that part of the Atlantic Ocea to the nort%of
360 North latitude" may, upon unanimous invitation of the parties, accede to it.
30. See Jackson, supra note 19, at 4.
31. Note, Ocean Pollution: An Examination of the Problem and an
Appeal for InternationalCooperation, 7 San Diego L. Rev. 574, 590 (1970).

1980]

State Responsibility

dealt with the problem de lege ferenda rather than reflect a solu.
tion de lege lata.3 2 But so long as there has not yet been created
an international regime governing the liability for such pollution
incidents, the lex lata solution of the liability problem gains priority
over the de lege ferenda solution for the parties involved in a given
incident.
The question, therefore, is whether international law does
contain general principles which may appropriately be applied to
such incidents. An answer to this question will also help solve the
question as to whether the State of Mexico is responsible for the
transjurisdictional oil pollution damage resulting from the Ixtoc I
blowout.

Part II
Liability and International Law
A.

The Traditional Law of State Responsibility:
Is It Appropriate?

The traditional law of state responsibility is based on fault
and requires the violation of a rule established by international
law. 3 3 The violation of such a rule, or, in other terms, of an obligation of international law, results from an act or omission which
32. E.g., Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development
of International Law, 14 Intl & Comp. L.Q. 1189, 1192 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Goldie, Liability for Damage].
33.
"Responsibility is simply the principle which establishes an obligation to make good any violation of international law producing injury, committed by the respondent State. . . . Responsibility appears, in principle, at
the moment that the internationally injurious act has taken place within the control of the State." C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International
Law 22-23 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Eagleton] (emphasis added). For a
brief outline of the general principles governing State responsibility, see
Eagleton, id.; E. Jiminez de Arichaga, International Responsibility, in Manual
of Public International Law 531 (M. Sorenson ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited
as Jiminez de Arechaga] ; Verdross & Simma, Universelles Volkerrecht 613-14,
n. 1 (1976); Berber, 3 Lehrbuch des Volkerrechts 1-2 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Berberl.
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34
thereby injures another state.
Here, a distinction has been made between direct and indirect
state responsibility. 3 5 Direct responsibility connotes the responsibility of a state for the acts or omissions of its government and
its agents. 3 6 Indirect responsibility is regarded as the responsibility
3
for injurious acts of individuals residing within the state's territory.
Such acts, however, must be imputable to the state whereas acts
imputed
of individuals acting under its authorization are generally
38
to the state even if they are committed "ultra vires."f
The traditional doctrine of the law of state responsibility,
heavily influenced by Roman law, was for a long time exclusively

based and, to date, is still based overwhelmingly on the establishment of fault,3 9 i.e., the intentional or negligent committance
of the injurious act. There is now, however, a strong tendency
toward an objective responsibility of states if the injurious act or
omission is committed by an official or an individual authorized
by the state to act on its behalf. 40 Thus, according to this doctrine,
the proof of fault is no longer required and that the mere existence
of a violation4 1of international law suffices to establish the state's
responsibility.
If it is, however, a matter of an injurious act of a private individual, the state will be held responsible only to ensure that redress
be given and, if necessary, to punish the private individual. This
34. Jimdnez de Ardchaga,supra note 33, at 534.
35. See Eagleton, supra note 33, at 214.
36. L. Oppenheim, International Law (8th ed. 1955) [hereinafter
cited as Oppenheim]. Oppenheim uses the term "direct" instead of "original"
and the term "vicarious" instead of 'indirect." He also interchanges "state
responsibility" with "international liability of states." This confusion in terminology reflects, inter alia, the high degree of dispute within the field of state
responsibility. "It would be difficult to find a topic beset with greater confusion
Garcia-Arnador, 2 Yearbook of the International Law
and uncertainty."
Commission (ILC) at 175 (1956). See also Berber, supra note 33, at 2.
37. Oppenheim, supra note 36,at 33940.
38. See Jimdnez de Ardchaga, supra note 33, at 531, 546-47 and decisions discussed therein.
39. Berber, supra note 33 at 6. H. Grotius formulated the principle
as "[q] ui in culpa non est, natura ad nihil tenetur." Quoted in Eagleton, supra
note 33, at 308. Oppenheim contends that [a] n act of state injuriousness to
another is nevertheless not an international delinquency if committed neither
willfully and maliciously nor with culpable negligence." Supra note 36, at 343.
40. See Jimdnez de Ardchaga, supra note 33, at 534-3 7.
41. Id.at534-35.
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is called indirect responsibility. 4 2 If a state, however, had a duty
under international law to prevent the individual from committing an
injurious act, or if it failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, its hitherto indirect responsibility
would turn automatically
43

into direct or original responsibility.
To date, however, due to the ongoing developments in state
responsibility and the many different opinions with respect to such
developments, a general formula governing the subject cannot be
44
Each case must be examined on its own merits.
established.
Thus the question must be addressed of how these principles keep
pace with activities which, due to their magnitude and potentiality
for harm, constitute a permanent threat to the world environment
and community-activities which, in spite of their dangerous aspects,
are lawful in themselves and carried out for the benefit and wellbeing of a particular society and even that of the world community.
These are activities such as nuclear development, space exploration
and operations, and offshore exploration and exploitation. Although
these activities are most often carried on by private individuals or
juridical persons, th, Y always need to be licensed by the state under
the jurisdiction of which they are undertaken. Additionally, licensing state usually derives direct benefits from these activities, e.g..
royalties and taxes, as well as indirect benefits through the subsequent promotion of the domestic economy. It would therefore
seem appropriate to postulate that states, Leing thus related to these
activities, should also share the burden of their disadvantages.
Assuming now that the question of liability for transjurisdictional pollution is governed by the law of state responsibility, the
notion of fault appears to be, in this context, highly inadequate.
For it must be borne in mind that, first, these activities operate at
the frontiers of science and technology. Even though they are
carried on with all due diligence, accidents resulting in widespread
damage may occur. In that event, i.e., in the absence of fault, no
compensation would have to be paid according to the traditional
fault requirement, which would be tantamount to placing the burden

42. Oppenhein, supra note 36, at 338; Eagleton, supra note 33, at 214.
43. Oppenheim, supra note 36, at 338.
44. See the report of Max Huber regarding the Affaire des biens britaniques au Maroc espagnol: "II n 'est pas possible d'exiger I 'applicationa toutes les
situations, d'un syst~me de justice repondant t des criteres minima du droit
international.... " 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 627 at 646.
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4 5
of the risk upon outsiders.
Second, the activity (e.g., offshore oil exploration and exploitation) is lawful in itself. The undertaking of the activity 4as
6
such does not constitute a violation of an international obligation.
Nonetheless, if an accident resulting in heavy transjurisdictional
pollution occurs even though the operation was carried on using due
diligence, how, in accordance with the law of state responsibility,,
shall the violation of an international obligation be established? "
The term "violation" requires the act of an individual or a group
of individuals:
the occurrence of transjurisdictional pollution
damage can hardly be called a violation of international law.
These questions and observations clearly reveal that the traditional law of state responsibility becomes arbitrary, inadequate and
48
inequitable when applied to cases of transjurisdictional pollution,

since the undertaking of such acts is generally lawful. In addition,
it appears to be in many instances impossible to prove the existence
of fault if damage occurred because of such an activity. As stated
above, no compensation is due in such a case according to the
traditional law of state responsibility, which, in the event of disaster, is tantamount to having the injured party bear the risk of
45. It may be in any state's discretion to implement its own pattern
of compensation regarding the question as to who has to bear the risk for activities which may cause serious damage, e.g., the public or the private enterprise.
In this context the notion of "social cost" has been introduced. See Goldie,
Liability for Damage, supra note 32, at 1212-13, and Goldie, Responsibility for
Pollution,supra note 19, at 284.
46. Offshore oil exploration and exploitation can only be carried out
at the frontiers of a coastal state's jurisdiction. The activity as such is not
only lawful but also legally encouraged. See art. 2 of the 1958 Convention
on the Continental Shelf, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, as well as the corresponding
I.C.N.T. provisions regarding the rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal
state in the EEZ as set forth in art. 56, particularly in 56(1)9a) and in art. 77
with respect to the rights of a coastal state over the continental shelf. The situation, therefore, differs from that of constructing a nuclear power-plant near
a frontier. See Randelzhofer & Simma, Das Kernkraftwerk an der Grenze:
Eine ultra-hazardousactivity im Schnittpunkt von internationalem Nachbarrecht
und Umweltschutz, in Festschrift fur F. Berber 388, especially at 423-26 (1973).
47. "Due diligence" means that the actor has taken every precaution
to prevent an accident that would cause heavy pollution. Even so, "it may
be impossible to arrive at a consensus as to the proper standard of care for
the activity's operation." Kelson, State Responsibility and the Abnormally
DangerousActivity, 13 Ilarv. Intl LJ. 197, 200 (1972).
48. Id.
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the activity and thus engendering serious injustices.
Therefore, in the case of oil pollution, where the scope of
potential harm is enormous, a necessary response to the insufficiency and inadequacy of the law of state responsibility in this
respect is to provide appropriate standards which allow redress
for injured parties without restricting them to the limited areas of
the law of state responsibility. In fact, important conventions in
the fields of civil aviation, nuclear energy, outer space, and maritime
vessel-source pollution have departed from the traditional approach
in that they impose strict liability on the undertaking of these
activities, which have been described as "abnormally dangerous"
or "ultra-hazardous.'

49

Characterizing these activities as such

does not imply that the activity is ultrahazardous [abnormally dangerous] in the sense
that there is a high degree of probability that the
hazard will materialize, but rather that the
consequences in the exceptional and perhaps
quite improbable event of the hazard materializing may be so far-reaching that special rules
concerning the liability for such consequences
are necessary if serious injustice and hardship
are to be avoided. Liability has shifted from
fault (including negligence) to risk with a view
to spreading more fairly the possible consequences of improbable but potentially disastrous
misadventure, making the burden of insurance
or other provision of security for compensation
in the event of misadventure a cost of the
adventure .50
This concept of strict liability relieves the injured party of the
burden of proof of fault, a burden which might be impossible to
However, the notion "abnormally dangerous" must be
meet. 5 1
extended because the above definition does not cover all cases to
which the doctrine of strict liability should be applied.
An oil spill, for example, might not be considered as disastrous
as a nuclear accident, but it merits the same treatment (i.e., the

49. Id. at 197; Jenks, Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities in International Law, 117 Recueils des Cours 105 (1966).
50. Id. at 107.
51. Id.
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imposition of strict liability) since, as has been pointed out, oil
spills occur more often and eventually add up to a similarly disastrous result.
How well the doctrine of strict liability .is established in international law remains to be determined. In the event, however, that it
does prove to be well established, there remains the question of
whether its application can be extended to other abnormally
dangerous activities where states have not as yet agreed-perhaps
because of the newness of the activity-to accept strict liability. The
applicability of the doctrine of strict liability to oil exploration and
exploitation in the continental shelf depends on the answers to these
questions.
B.

Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities
as Applied in International Law

The question of whether the principle of strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities is firmly established in international
law must be examined with reference to the sources of international
law as set forth in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice [hereinafter referred to as ICJ Statute] ,2 which
provides that:
The Court, whose function is to decide
in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contracting States;
(b) international custom, as evidence
of a general practice of law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Art. 59,
judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determina52. The statute was entered into force (for the United States as well)
on Oct. 24, 1975, 59 Stat. 1055, TS 993, 3 Berans 1153. All members of the
United Nations are ipso facto parties to the statute according to U.N. Charter
art. 93.
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tion of rules of law.

In the absence of a valid overall international convention
applicable to liability for oil pollution damage resulting from the
exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf, 5 we shall
focus on customary international law, taking into account the
general principles of law (Art. 38(1)(c), I.CJ. Statute) and the
subsidiary sources as enumerated in Art. 38(1)(d) of the Statute.
1.

Customary International Law

a.

Definition

Customary international law may be briefly defined as the usage
exercised by the overwhelming majority of states over a considerable
period of time in the consciousness of acting under a legal obligation, 5 4 which is often referred to as "longa consuetudo et opinio
juris sive necessitatis. ,6s
b.

Elements of Customary InternationalLaw

Difficulties arise with respect to the question of what can be
considered sufficient evidence of such "longa consuetudo et opinio
juris sive necesitatis." The usual approach to proving a rule of
customary international law is to adduce in a fairly undifferentiated
manner all evidence which may support the establishment of such
56
a rule.
Since it is quite difficult to distill persuasive evidence from
state practice alone, richer and more accessible sources have to be
53. Offshore Liability Convention, supra note 29. Except for the
regional Offshore Liability Convention concerning the civil liability for oil pollution damage, see supra note 29, the Offshore Liability Convention has not yet
entered into force, as has been already mentioned. However, more special attention shall be given to this convention in the text accompanying notes 133-139,
infra.
54. See the International Court of Justice in its Asylum Case opinion
of Nov. 20, 1950: "La Partie qui invoque une coutume ... doit prouver que la
r~gle est conforme a un usage constant et uniforme . . . et que cet usage traduit
un droit et un devoir. Ceci d~coule de Particle38 du Statut de la Cour.. .. "
1950 [I.CJ.J at 276-77. There is also a far-reaching agreement among scholars
in the field; see, e.g., F. Berber, Rivers in International Law 46 (1959).
55. See A. Verdross, Quellen des universellen Volkerrechts, at 95
(1973).
56. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International
Law, 41 Brit Y.B. Int'l L. 275 (1965-66).

N.YJ. Intl & Comp. L.

[Vol. II

57

taken into consideration.
58
Such sources include treaties and international conventions,
as well as resolutions and declarations of international organizations.
These latter are not legally binding but serve, nonetheless, as valuable
and persuasive devices for the establishment of a rule of customary
international law, in that they give strong evidence of an opinio
Furthermore, the decisions of international courts and
juris.5 9
international arbitrations, as well as the writings of the most disscholars in international law, should be taken into
tinguished
60
account.
2.

Treaties

The concept of strict liability has been introduced in a number
of international conventions. The following section will point out
those conventions specifically and will examine the extent to which
strict liability has been adopted as the appropriate answer to various
kinds of activities involving a great deal of risk. Also, the basic
structure and concept of those conventions will be outlined in
order to reveal the concepts on which states are ready to agree,
the extent to which states are involved in these activities and,
whether an assumption of state responsibility for these activities
can be made.
a.

Civil Aviation

In civil aviation, a sharp distinction must be made between
the carrier's liability respecting its passengers and its liability respecting third parties on the surface. The former differs from the latter
61
in that the passenger is a consenting participant in the activity;
only the latter, however, is of interest here, as we are essentially
concerned with third-party damage.
As early as 1933, the concept of strict liability was incorporated into the Convention for the Clarification of Certain Rules relating to Damages Caused by Aircraft to Third-Parties on the Sur57. See Berber, supra note 56, at 48-49; see also E. Klein, Umweltschutz
im volkerrechtlichen Nachbarrecht 87-88 (1976).
58. See Vedross & Simma, supra note 33, at 295; Berber, supra note 54,
at 48-49; Klein, supra note 57. at 88-89.
59. Id. at 88. See also F. Berber, I Lehrbuch des Volkerrects 65 (1977).
60. Art. 38 1(4), I.CJ. Statut; see also I. Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law 19 (2d ed. 1973); Berber, supra note 54, at 49.
61. SeeJenks, supra note 49,at 110.
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face, opened for signature at Rome on May 29, 1933.62 The 1933
Convention, which has not come into force, has been superseded
by the Rome Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft
to Third Parties on the Surface of Oct. 7, 1952.63
Article 1(1) of the 1952 Rome Convention provides that
any person who suffers damage on the surface
shall, upon proof only that damage was caused
by an aircraft in flight or by any person or thing
falling therefrom, be entitled to compensation.
Nevertheless there shall be no right to compensation if the damage is not a direct consequence
of the incident giving rise thereto, or if the
damage results from the mere fact of passage
of the aircraft through the airspace in conformity with existing air traffic regulations.
The first sentcnce is, in its content, essentially the same as Article
2 of the 1933 Rome Convention. The liability is attached to the
the aircraft
operator of the aircraft, 6 4 i.e., the one who utilizes
65
or authorizes his servants or agents to use the aircraft.
The person normally liable, however, is excused from liability
if the damage resulted as a direct consequence of armed conflict
or civil disturbance, or if such person has been deprived of the use
of the aircraft by act of public authority. 6 6 Such person is also
not liable if the damage was caused through the negligence or the
wrongful act or omission of the injured person, and he is only
67
partly liable if the injured person contributed to the damage.
62. I Foreign Relations of the United States 968 (1933) [hereinafter
cited as 1933 Rome Convention].
63. Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties
on the Surface, Oct. 7, 1952,310 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter cited as 1952 Rome
Convention].
64. Art. 2(1), 1952 Rome Convention; art. 4(1), 1933 Rome
Convention.
65. Art. 2(2), 1952 Rome Convention; art. 4(2), 1933 Rome
Convention.
66. Art. 5, 1952 Rome Convention.
67. Id., art. 6. Although the 1952 Rome Convention provides for
partial exoneration from liability in cases involving contributory negligence,
it also provides: "Nevertheless there shall be no such exoneration or reduction
if,in the case of negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a servant or
agent, the person who suffers the damage proves that his servant or agent was

acting outside the scope of his authority." Id.
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The extent of 6liability,
however, is limited, depending on the weight
8
of the aircraft.
In order to secure the operator's capability of meeting the
financial requirements which strict liability imposes on him, the
Rome Conventions require that6 9 the operator obtain insurance

or some other financial guarantee.
Even though, as has often been alleged, the likelihood of
aircraft accidents is remote, the scope of harm in such an event
must be deemed abnormally dangerous. 70 The main feature of
the two Rome Conventions is that the mere fact that damage is
directly caused by a lawful activity suffices for the establishment
of liability.
As the quid pro quo of the operator's liability, however, the
amount to which the operator can be held liable is limited. 7 1 The
injured person is relieved of the time-consuming and sometimes
impossible burden of proving either fault or negligence on the
part of the aircraft operator.
The extent of liability has to be limited for several reasons, 7 2
the most obvious being that the threat of unlimited liability could
deter private capital investment in an activity of general societal
desirability. Furthermore, unlimited liability would be likely to
preclude the insurability of the risk.
While the Rome Conventions in themselves cannot evidence
the concept of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities as a general principle of international law, they can, nonethe-

68.

Id., art. 11.

This article sets forth limitations of property damage

ranging from a maximum liability of 500,000 francs for an aircraft not exceeding 1,000 kilogrammes to "10,500,000 francs plus 100 francs per kilogramme

over 50,000 kilogrammes for aircraft weighing more than 50,000 kilogrammes."
Id. at art. 11 (1)(a)-(e). Article 11 also provides that liability for death or injury
to persons shall not exceed 50,000 francs per victim. Id. at art. 11 (2). See also
Art. 8, 1933 Rome Convention.
69. Id. art. 15(l)(4).
70. Air transportation is still regarded as the safest means of transportation. One nevertheless need only recall the May, 1979, crash of the DC-10 in
Chicago and the fact that aircraft often fly over heavily populated areas in order
to imagine the possible consequences of airplane crashes. See N.Y. Times, May
26, 1979,at A1, col. 6.

71.

See Kelsen,supra note 47,at 213.

72. See also Brown, The Rome Conventions of 1933 and 1952: Do
They Point to a Moral?, 28J. Air. L. & Comm. 418,420-21 (1962).
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less, point out the direction in which international law tends to
move.
b.

Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
Nuclear Activities
The potential hazards of a nuclear accident and the extent
of possible radioactive contamination have attracted widespread
public interest in the use of nuclear energy.
Man's mastery of nuclear processes has enabled him to use
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Yet a nuclear accident may
well be beyond his ability to control. The likelihood of such an
accident occurring is probably remote, but the Three Mile Island
incident and other minor incidents which industry and government are normally unwilling to report serve as strong reminders
that the possibility of accidents does still exist.
It is for this reason that the field of nuclear damage and possible compensation schemes have received such intensive international consideration and
resulted, in a three-year period, in four
7
multilateral conventions. 3
As one might expect, these conventions share great similarities.
It is, however, appropriate to consider each one separately.
(1) 1963 Vienna Convention. As is the case in the Rome
Conventions, liability is channeled
to the operator (i.e., the operator
74
of a nuclear installation).
The operator is to be liable when a nuclear accident causes
damage in three instances: (a) in his nuclear installation, 7 5 (b)
in situations involving nuclear material coming from or originating
in his nuclear installations, 76 and (c) in instances involving nuclear

73. The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage,
opened for signature May 21, 1963, reprinted in Bock, Ruster & Simma, supra
note 29, vol. XII, at 6082, hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention; Convention
on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, done at Paris, July 29,
1960, id. at 5972, [hereinafter cited as OEEC-Convention]; Convention
Supplementary to the Paris Convention of July 29, 1960 (OEEC-Convention),
done at Brussels, Jan. 31, 1963, id. at 5990, [hereinafter cited as Brussels
Convention]; Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, done
at Brussels, May 25, 1962, 57 Am. J. Intl L. 268 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Nuclear Ships Convention].
74. Art. 2 (1) of the Vienna Convention, supra note 73.
75. Id., art. 2(1)(a).
76. Id., art. 2(1)(b).
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77
material sent to his nuclear installations.
In accordance with Article 4, the liability of the operator
shall be absolute, i.e., in the terms of this convention, liability
for the nuclear damage arises upon the [mere] proof that it was
78
caused in one of the above mentioned instances.
The absolute liability, however, is, as may be expected, subject to qualifications. The operator may be wholly or partially
relieved from his obligation to pay compensation to the injured
person if the damage was caused wholly or partially by the injured
person's intent or negligence. 7 9 The operator is not liable if the
incident is caused directly due to an armed conflict, hostilities,
civil war or insurrection, 80 or if it is caused by grave natural disaster of an exceptional character
unless the law of the installation
81
contrary.
the
to
provides
state
Again, as a quid pro quo for the imposition of absolute liability,
the installation state may limit the operator's liability; however,
this limit must be no less than $5 million in United States currency. 8 2 The operator, therefore, shall be required to obtain insurance. 8 3 Otherwise the injured party may not be able to recover

damage.

The "[r] ights of compensation [however] . . .shall be

extinguished if an action is not brought within ten years from the
date of the nuclear incident. ' 8 4 This provision takes the long-term
effects of radioactive contamination into account.
(2) OEEC Convention. The pattern of the Vienna Convention substantially resembles the earlier, but merely regional, OEEC
Convention. In the latter, although it is not expressly provided for
as such, liability is strict, since proof that damage was caused by a
nuclear incident involving either nuclear fuel or radioactive products,
waste or nuclear substances coming from such an installation is
sufficient to establish liability. 8 5 This liability is subject to the

77. Id., art. 2(1)(c).
78. Id., art. 2(1).
79. Id., art. 4(2); see also art. 6 of the 1952 Rome Convention and art.
3 of the 1933 Rome Convention, supra note 62.
80. Art. 4(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention, supra note 73.
81. Id., art. 4(3)(b).
82. Id., art. 5(1).
83. Id., art. 7.
84. Id., art. 6(1).
85. Art. 3 of the OEEC Convention, supra note 73.
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same qualifications set forth in the Vienna Convention. The right of
compensation is, as in the Vienna Convention, extinguished after
ten years, and, according to the OEEC Convention, liability is not
to exceed 15 million European Monetary Agreement units of
account. 8 6 In the more recent Brussels Convention, this figure was
increased8 7to 120 million European Monetary Agreement units of
account.
A major difference, however, is that the installation state
is obligated to play an active role in securing the compensation
amount in that it must provide funds from public resources to cover
damages assessed between 5 million and 70 million units;8 8 the
shall be provided by a joint effort of
remaining 50 million 8units
9
the contracting States.
(3)

Nuclear Ship Convention. The Nuclear Ship Convention

does not call for further discussion since it adopts substantially
the same scheme as that used in the three conventions mentioned
above. All of these conventions recognize beforehand the liability
of the operator, but they also evidence a shift to ultimate state
responsibility. Thus, Article 7 of the Vienna Convention expressly
provides that:
The Installation State shall ensure the payment
of claims for compensation for nuclear damage
which have been established against the operator
by providing the necessary funds to the extent
that the yield of insurance or other financial
security is inadequate to satisfy such claims,
but not in excess of the limits, if any, established pursuant to Article 5 [i.e., $5,000,000].
86. Id., art. 2(b). One unit of account of the European Monetary agreement was, according to art. 24 of the agreement, based on 0.88867088 grams
of fine gold. For the text of the agreement, see 3 Eur. Y.B. 213. Yet the
European Monetary Agreement is not in force anymore. The present European
Unit of Account consists of a basket of fixed amounts of the nine currencies
of the member countries of the European Community. Its current value must
be determined on a daily basis. As of February, 1980, one unit of account
For more details on the exchange rate
equalled approximately $1.35.
mechanism, see the IMF Survey, March 19, 1979, Supplement: The European
Monetary System, at 97-100.
87. Art. 3(a) of the OEEC Convention, supra note 73.
88. Art. 3(b) (ii) of the Brussels Convention, supra note 73.
89. Id., art. 3(b)(iii).
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This approach is also taken by the OEEC Convention as the Explanatory Memorandum reveals:
Whatever conditions are laid down by the competent public authority, something untoward
could happen, such as where the financial
guarantor is bankrupt, or where insurance is
per installation for a fixed period and after a
first incident it is impossible to reinstate the
financial security up to the maximum liability
of the operator. It was recognized that these
circumstances could not set aside the obligation of the operator under Article 10 or that of
the State which is required to ensure that
the operator always holds financial security
up to his maximum liability. The Contracting
Parties may therefore be led to intervene in
such a situation to avoid their international
responsibilitiesbeing involved. 9 0
The same pattern has been adopted by the Nuclear Ship Convention, 9 1 in that it requires the licensing state to provide the necessary
funds up to the limit laid down in the Convention, 9 2 i.e., to ensure
the payment of claims for compensation for nuclear damage.
The term "absolute" liability as used in the Vienna Convention is, however, somewhat misleading. It indicates that the liability
been mentioned, is not
is not subject to qualifications which, as has
93
the case in the four "nuclear" conventions.
It is, therefore, suggested that for the purpose of this paper
the term "strict liability" applies to the nuclear conventions as well.
c.

Space Activities

The question of international liability for damage caused by
activities carried on in space arose early in the history of the peaceful exploration of space. 94 In 1963 the General Assembly of the
90. OEEC Convention, Explanatory Memorandum [1960], Eur. Y.B.
225,
49 (emphasis added). This view is explicitly incorporated in art. 3(a)
of the Brussels Convention, supra note 73.
91. See Nuclear Ships Convention, supra note 73, art. 3(2).
92. ld., art. 3(1).
93. See Jenks, supra note 49, at 144.
94. See lioscnhall, Space Law, Liability and Insurable Risks, 12 The
Forum 141 (1976-77).
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United Nations declared:
Each State which launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space, and
each state from whose territory or facility an
object is launched, is internationally liable
for damage to a foreign State or its natural or
juridicial persons by such object or its comon the Earth, in air space, or in
ponent parts
95
outer space.
This principle was later incorporated into Article VII of the 1967
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exof Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
ploration and Use
96
Celestial Bodies.
The international concern with compensation for damage arising out of space activities led to the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. 9 7 Article II of the
Space Objects Convention makes clear that the phrase "internationally liable" refers to a strict liability standard.
The necessity of adopting either responsibility for risk or strict
liability as a governing principle for sp. :e activities has never been
seriously questioned. 9 8 Here again, it appears to be difficult, if
not impossible, to prove negligence or fault. Further, the grave
risk to third parties posed by space activities justifies the imposition of absolute liability.
The Space Liability Convention marked the first time that
99
such liability was to be borne directly by the launching state.
95. Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, U.N. General Assembly Resolution
1962 (XVIII), Dec. 13, 1963.
96. Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 [hereinafter
referred to as the Outer Space Treaty] ; Cf. Hosenball, supra note 94.
97. Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, [hereinafter
referred to as the Space Liability Convention] ; see generally Foster, The Convention on InternationalLiability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, [ 1972]
Can. Y.B. Intel L. 137.
98. See Wiewiorowska, Some Problems of State Responsibility in Outer
Space Law, 7 J. Space L. 23, 32 (1979).
99. See Foster, supra note 97, at 150; see also, Wiewiorowska, supra
note 98, at 25-28. The Space Liability Convention does, however, constitute
some disadvantages with respect to private individuals: see Wilkins, Substantial
Bases for Recovery for Injuries Sustained by Private Individuals as a Result
of Fallen Space Objects, 6 J. Space L. 161 (1978). Article l(c) of the Space
Liability Convention, supra note 97, provides that "[the term 'launching
State' means: (i) a State which launches or procures the launching of a space
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The development of space activity has shown that such activities
are carried out by the States themselves because of the prohibitive
cost of such enterprises, and, consequently, private parties play
only a subordinate role. 1 0 0 Since the launching state generally
draws substantial benefits from space activity, it seems appropriate
to hold it responsible for the damages it causes thereby.
The convention also provided that liability for damage incurred
on the surface of the Earth is absolute, 10 1 with the only exception
being cases involving either gross negligence or intentional act or
omission on the part of the injured party. 1 0 2 The limitation of
liability normally involves four factors:
1) strict and absolute
liability, as in the present convention; 2) the incalculability of
risk; 3) the societal desirability of continuing the abnormally dangerous but beneficial activity; and, 4) the channeling of liability to
a private operator who is charged with the duty to obtain insurance
so as to assure the payment of compensation should it become
necessary. It must be noted that the operator
cannot obtain insurance or security beyond a certain limit 03 However,the launching state upon which absolute liability is imposed usually possesses
the economic
strength to bear the burden of unlimited absolute
104

liability.
d.

Marine and Fresh Water Pollution
(1) Pollution of Fresh Water Resources. Because fresh water
resources are of pressing concern only to a relatively small number
of states, this field has not generally been subject to multilateral
agreement. A substantial number of bi- and trilateral agreements
exist to regulate the use of intemational rivers, drainage basins
and lakes. 10 5 These do not, however, generally provide a basis
for liability; far less do they provide for strict liability. 10 6 The
Council of Europe and the European Communities have attempted
a multilateral approach to the utilization and prevention of pollu-

object; (ii) a State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched."
100. See Kelson, supra note 47, at 215.
101. Art. II, Space Liability Convention, supra note 97.
102. Id., art. IV.
103. See Foster, supra note 97, at 153-54.
104. Id., at 154.
105. See J. Ballenegger, La Pollution en Droit International at 26 (1975).
106. Id. The USSR seems to be an exception in this respect. Id. at
26-28.
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tion of fresh water resources. 1 0 7 These attempts have not yet led to
a valid legal regime of liability.
(2) Marine Pollution. The question of liability has received
widespread attention in regard to the pollution of the marine environment. This is especially true in the case of marine pollution
by hydrocarbons. 1 0 8 Whereas the likelihood of a nuclear or space
from
accident may still be considered remote, "the risk of harm
10 9
oil pollution is major in both probability and magnitude."
(i) The 1958 Geneva Convention. Article 24 of the Convention on the High Seas 1 1 0 provides that:
Every state shall draw up regulations to prevent
pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil
from ships or pipelines or resulting from the
exploitation and exploration of the seabed and
treaty
its subsoil, taking account
1 1 1 of existing
provisions on the subject.
This provision explicitly requires states to take precautions to
prevent the pollution of the seas. If a member state falls short
of this obligation, it will certainly be viewed as being in breach of
the treaty.
However, the Convention does not set forth specific standards
to be incorporated in such regulation. Hence, in the event of pollution, a member state which has drawn up regulations with a view
toward preventing the pollution of the seas could not be held
responsible since it has complied with the obligation as set forth in
Article 24 of the Convention on the High Seas.
State responsibility under the regime of this provision can be established only upon proof that the event occurred due to the failure
of a state to adopt such regulations. Therefore, in a given event of
pollution it would be difficult, if not impossible, to etablish state
responsibility under the regime of this convention, not to mention
107. See European Communities: Proposal for a Council Decision establishing a uniform procedure for the exchange of information on the quality of surface fresh water in the Community, May 4 1976, reprinted in Ruster & Simma,
supra note 29, vol. XI at 5842, for an example of the European efforts in this
area. See also recommendation 436 on Fresh Water Pollution Control in Europe,
Oct. 1, 1965, reprinted in Ruster & Simma, supra note 29, vol. Xl at 5728.
108. The potential for harm resulting from marine oil pollution was
discussed in the introduction to this article.

109. See Kelson, supra note 47, at 224.
110. Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, entered into force June 10, 1964.
111. Emphasis added.
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state responsibility based on the concept of strict liability.
Article 5(7) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf112
seems to apply an even more stringent standard: "The coastal State
is obliged to undertake, in the safety zones, all appropriate measures
for the protection of the sea from harmful agents." 1 1 1 What, however, are these appropriate measures? They are still subject to
determination. The more stringent standard seems, nonetheless,
to facilitate the burdensome task of establishing state responsibility
in the absence of corresponding action on the part of the coastal
state. If such a state, however, is able to prove successfully that the
highest safety standards known were applied prior to a given polluting event, the state will not be responsible under Article 5(7).
Thus, this provision cannot be taken as an example of the application of strict liability. It does, however, indicate that a costal
state is not free from international obligations with respect to
activities on the continental shelf.
(ii) Vessel Source Pollution. The heightened public concern
over increased oil pollution that came in the wake of the Torrey
Canyon disaster1 1 3 eventually led to the adoption of the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties1 14 and the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage," l5 both of
which were prepared by the Intergovernmental Marine Consultive
Organization (IMCO).
As the title indicates, the Intervention Convention regulates
the legal options open to coastal states to take such measures "on
the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate
grave and imminent danger to their coastlines or related interests
from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil. .... 116
Thus, this convention is of little concern in the context of this
article, because the scope of this paper is limited to liability that
attaches after the polluting incident has occurred.
It was only after long debate that the principle of strict liability

112. Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.TS. 311, entered into force June 10, 1964.
113. See Nanda, supra note 8.
114. Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. 8068, reprintedin 64 Am.J.
Int'l L. 471 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Intervention Convention].
115. Done at Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in Am.J. Int'l L. 481
(1970).
116. Id., art. 1(1). This issue was at stake when the English bombed the
Torrey Canyon; see Balleneger, supra note 105, at 93-94, especially at n. 82.
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was incorporated into the Oil Pollution Convention. 11 7 Here again,
the Torrey Canyon disaster provided the incentive.1 1 8 Article 11(1)
of the Convention provides that "the owner of a ship ...

shall be

liable for any pollution damage caused by oil which has escaped
or been discharged from the ship. . .

."

The strict liability of the

owner is subject to the usual qualifications, 11290 with the addition
of cause etrang'rhas an additional exoneration.
The meaning given to the words "pollution damage" is relatively broad in that it covers 'loss or damage caused outside the ship
carrying oil by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge
of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur,
and includes the costs of preventive measures and further loss or
damage caused by preventive measures." 12 1 However, the Convention is limited in scope to "pollution damage caused on the
territory including the territorial sea of a contracting state and
to preventive measures taken to prevent or to minimize such
damage.", 12 2 Therefore, the Convention does not consider pollution
damage to living resources nor does it address possible detrimental
effects to the ecological balance of the oceans. 12 ?
As quid pro quo for the imposition of strict liability, the
ship owner may limit his liability to an amount of 2,000 francs
for each ton of the ship's tonnage, whereby the maximum amount
of 210 million francs shall not be exceeded, 12 4 unless the incident occurred "as a result of the actual fault or privity of the
117. Id. at 100; see also Goldie, Liability for Oil Pollution Disasters:
InternationalLaw and Delimitation of Competences in a Federal Policy, 6 J.
Mar. L. & Com. 303,at 305-07 (1974-75).
118. Id. at 305.
119. OilPollution Convention, supra note 115, art. 1II (2), (3).

120. Id., art. 111 (2)(b).
121. Id., art. I(b).
122. Id., art. 1I. For a discussion of the shortcomings of such a restriction, see Ballenegger, supra note 107,at 104 n. 128.
123. Damage to areas of the ocean beyond the territorial seas might,
as well, have detrimental effects on the ecological balance within the territorial
sea. For a discussion of the potential effects, see Blumer, supra note 23, at 322.
In the 11-year period between the Torrey Canyon accident in 1967 and the

Amoco Cadiz disaster, there were sixty major oil spills from tankers dumping
a total of 1.64 million tons of oil into the ocean. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1978,
at A2, col. 1.
124. OlPollutionConvention, supra note 115,145. V(l).
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owner.... -"125 Further, the owner of a ship carrying more than
2,000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo is required to obtain insurance
or otherwise post security. 12 6 The ultimate responsibility of a
flag state, albeit not expressly provided, is nonetheless implied
if a contracting state falls short of the obligation to ensure that the
another form of financial
owner of a ship maintains insurance or
127
security as provided by the Convention.
A major disadvantage of the Oil Pollution Convention is that
the insurer or other person providing financial security, against
whom the claim for compensation may be brought directly, can
invoke the defense that the pollution damage was caused by the
willful misconduct of the owner of the ship. 1 2 " This obviously raises
the possibility that the Convention's clear intent to assure that all
pollution incidents are adequately covered against risk will be
defeated.
(iii) 1976 London Convention. The 1976 London Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage From Offshore Operations 12 9 essentially copied the 1969 Oil Pollution Convention,
but this article will discuss, albeit briefly, those provisions which
depart from those of the 1969 Convention. The Offshore Conven:
tion channels the strict libility to the operator of the polluting
installation. 13 0 In contrast to the Oil Pollution Convention, cause
13 1
etrangkre does not constitute an exoneration from liability.
This more stringent approach apparently derives from the fact that
to be higher than that
the potential for a well blowout is considered
13 2
for a vessel-source pollution accident.
The amount up to which the operator can be liable is limited

125.
126.
127.
provides:

Id., art. V(2).
Id., art. VIJ(l).
Id., art. VII(9), in accordance with art. VII(1) and (2). Art. VIl(9)
"A Contracting State shall not permit a ship under its flag to which

this Article applies to trade unless a certificate has been issued under Paragraph
2 or 12 of this Article."

128. Id., art. VII(S).
129. See note 29 supra;see generally Dubois, The 1976 London Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damagefrom Offshore Operations, 9 J.
Mar. L. & Com. 61 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Dubois].
130. Art. 3(1) of the Offshore Liability Convention, supra note 29.
131. See Dubois, supra note 129, at 64-65.

132. Id. at 65.

1980)

State Responsibility

to 30 million Special Drawing Rights1 3 3 until five years have elapsed
from the date on which the Convention opened for signature, and
13 4
to the amount of 40 million Special Drawing Rights thereafter.
to obtain insurAs in previous conventions, the operator is required
13 5
ance or otherwise to demonstrate financial security.
3.

Declarations and Resolutions of Public International Bodies

Public international bodies obviously play a major role in
the formulation and advancement of international law. Although
they are generally incapable of establishing binding rules of international law, their work as manifested in declarations and resolutions
may serve as evidence of customary international law, reaffirm its existence, or indicate its emergence. In this light, declarations, resolutions or pronouncements of public international bodies can generally
be viewed as an indication of opinio juris.
a.

1972 United Nations Conference

Principle 21 of the Declaration on the Human Environment
issued by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in 1972 at Stockholm proclaims that the States bear the
"responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States
or of areas beyond the limit of national jurisdiction." 13 6 While
this principle does not explicitly mandate strict liability, it does
make clear that the establishment of state responsibility depends on
the fact that the damage was caused by an activity carried out within
a state's jurisdiction. No reference to a breach of an international
obligation is made. According to Principle 21, the state should
either refrain from or prohibit activities where it is incapable of
ensuring that no damage will be caused beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. If the state nevertheless carries out or allows a private
entity to carry out such activities because of their benefit to the

133. "'Special Drawing Right' means Special Drawing Right as defined by
the International Monetary Fund and used for its own operations and transactions." Art. 1(9) of the Offshore Liability Convention, supra note 30.
134. Id., art. 3(1).
135. Id., art. 8(l).
136. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Ruster & Simna, supra note 29, Vol. 1, at 118.
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state's society, it will then also have to bear the responsibility for
transjurisdictional damage which might be caused. Principle 22
emphasizes the need for furthering the elaboration of rules concerning liability and compensation for transjurisdictional pollution damage.
b.

United Nations Resolutions
Principles 21 and 22 of the Stockholm declaration have been
reconsidered and affirmed in United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions 2995 and 2990 of December 15, 1972.137
Resolution 2996, which was adopted by 112 votes with no
counter-votes and 10 absentions, expressly states that "those prin1 38
ciples [21 and 221 lay down the basic rule governing this matter."
Although the Stockholm Declaration and the just-mentioned
United Nations resolutions are not sufficient to establish customary
international law, they nevertheless provide, through their widespread acceptance, strong evidence of opinio juris.
Draft European Convention on the Protection of Fresh Water
Against Pollution
Article 7(1) of the Draft Convention on the Protection of
Fresh Water Against Pollution 13 9 provides:
"Any person who
suffers damage in any contracting state arising from water pollution
in any other contracting state shall be entitled to compensation .... "
Damages shall be recoverable only insofar as the harm was caused
by acts that contravene existing international standards of water
quality.140
Article 8 attaches liability for compensation to the contracting
state in whose territory any water pollution arises, whether wholly
or in part. This Draft Convention is of interest in the context
of this article in that it essentially reflects the approach to transc.

137. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2995 (XXVII) (Co.operation
Between States in the Field of the Environment), Dec. 15, 1972, reprinted in
Ruster & Simma, supra note 29, at 149, and Resolution 2996 (XXVII) (International Responsibility of States in Regard to the Environment), Dec. 15, 1972,
id. at 151.
138. Id.
139. Adopted by Recommendation 555 by the Consultative Assembly
of the Council of Europe, May 12, 1969; text reprinted in Ruster & Simma,
supra note 29, Vol. XI, at 5748.
140. Id. at 5748.
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jurisdictional pollution as set forth in Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration. The burden of liability is to be borne directly and
totally by the state in whose jurisdiction the pollution originated.
4.

International Judicial Decisions

Generally, international judicial decisions bind only the parties
who litigate those decisions, and therefore constitute a merely supplemental source of international law. 14 1 This, however, is somewhat misleading, because international judicial decisions are customarily accorded great weight and authority and are constantly
relied upon by parties to disputes in the public international law
arena. The International Court of Justice has, for example, developed a consistent jurisprudence with respect to various questions
and issues in international law. 14 2 Of similar importance is the
jurisprudence of the various international courts of arbitration.
Accordingly, the outcome of international judicial decisions,
especially if they reflect agreement on a particular issue, must be
given great weight. The following is a discussion of some judicial
decisions which are relevant in the context of this article: the
144 the Lac
Trail-Smelter arbitrations, 1 4 3 the Corfu-Channel case
46
Lanoux arbitration, 14 5 and the Gut Dam arbitration.1
141. See generally Verdross & Simma, supra note 33, at 319-22 with
See also C. F. Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for
extensive reference.
Injuries to Aliens 32-35 (1967).
142. See Bernhardt, Homogenitat, Kontinuitat und Dissonanzen in der
Rechtsprechung des Internationalen Gerichtshofs, 33 Zeitschriff fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 1 (1973).
143. 3 U.N.RJ.A.A. 1905, 1938 (1938 & 1941); see generally Hoffman,
State Responsibility in InternationalLaw and TransboundaryPollution Injuries,
25 Intl & Comp. L.Q. 509 at 513-16 (1976); Goldie, supra note 32, at 1226-31.
144. 1949 I.CJ. 4; see Goldie, supra note 32, at 1226; Utton, Inter.
national Water Quality Law, in L. Teclaff & A. Utton, International Environmental Law 154 at 160 (1974); Teclaff, InternationalLaw and the Protection
of the Oceansfrom Pollution, id., 104 at 120; I. Schneider, World Public Order
of the Environment 49 (1979).
145. 12 U.N.RJ.A.A. 281 (1957), digested in 53 Am. J. Intl L. 156
(1959); see also Utton, supra note 144; Schneider, supra note 144.
146. See Canada-United States Settlement of Gut Dam Claims, Sept. 22,
1968, Report of the Agent of the United States before the Lake Ontario Claims
Tribunal, 8 Intl Legal Materials 118 (1969). See generally Lillich, The Gut
Dam Clams Agreement with Canada, 59 Am. J. Intl L. 892 (1965); Schneider,
supra note 144, 50, 165-66.
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The Trail-Smelter Arbitration
The Trail-Smelter arbitration between the United States and
Canada is the leading international case in the field of transboundary
decided by an international tribunal to
pollution. It is the only case
14 7
deal directly witli this issue.
The Trail-Smelter case concerned claims brought by the United
States for damage caused to crops in the farming areas around
Northpost, Washington. The damage was proved to have resulted
from the sulphur dioxide fumes emitted by a smelting plant owned
by Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada, Ltd.
Further, the damage was due in part to certain characteristics of river
and air currents in the valley shared by the two countries. The
Tribunal held that Canada was responsible under international law
for the crop damage caused by the smelting plant:
Under the principles of international law.., no
state has the right to use or permit the use of
its territory in such a manner as to cause injury
by fumes in or to the territory of another or
the properties of another therein, when the case
is of serious consequence and the injury14 is
8
established by clear and convincing evidence.
Not only did the Tribunal hold Canada directly responsible for the
pollution, but it held that the mere fact that the damage arose out
of an activity carried on in Canada sufficed for such liability to
attach. 14 9 There is no mention of fault in the Tribunal's opinion.
Thus, the Tribunal implicitly based its decision on strict liability.
a.

The Corfu.ChannelCase
In the Corfu-Channel case, 1 50 which involved the United
Kingdom and Albania, the International Court of Justice had to
decide the question of Albania's responsibility at international
law for damage caused to a British warship by exploding mines
in Albanian waters. The Court found Albania responsible by relying
on "certain general and well-known principles" including "every
State's obligation not to allow its territory to be used for acts conb.

147.
148.
149.
150.

To the writer's knowledge.
3 U.N.RJ.A.A. at 1965-66.
Goldie, Liability for Damage, supra note 32, at 1230-31.
See note 144 supra.
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15 1
trary to the rights of other States."
Although the Corfu-Channel case was not concerned with environmental issues, its language, as well as the principle stated above,
nonetheless constitute pertinent and persuasive evidence as to the
extent of a state's responsibility for damage caused by activities
carried on in its territory. Here again the liability was predicated
solely upon the fact that Albania had allowed its territory to be
used in such a way that damage to the property of another state
resulted, and the plaintiff state 1was
not required to prove fault
52
on the part of the defendant state.

c.

The Lac Lanoux Arbitration
The Lac Lanoux case 1 5 3 involved a dispute between Spain

and France as to the legality of a change proposed by France in

its part of a river system which was also used by Spain, which change
was to be implemented without Spain's consent. The tribunal
stated:
It would then have been argued that the works
would bring about a defined pollution of the
waters of the Carol [the river through which
the French Lac Lanoux empties into Spain] or
that the returned water would have a chemical
composition or temperature or some other
characteristics which could injure Spanish
interests. Spain could then
have claimed that
154
her rights had been injured.
The tribunal decided in favor of France, but made clear in dicta
that the state responsibility based on a concept of strict liability
would have governed in case of a contrary finding for Spain. 15 5
d.

The Gut Dam Arbitrations
Gut Dam 1 5 6 was another arbitration between the United States
and Canada. The facts can be briefly summarized as follows. In
1903 the Canadian government proceeded, after long investigations,
to construct a dam for the purpose of improving the navigation
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

[19491 I.CJ. at 22.
See Goldie, mpra note 32,at 1230.31.
See note 145 supra.
12 U.N.R.I.A.A. 303.
See Schneider, supra note 144, at 49.50.
See note 146 supr.
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of the St. Lawrence river. In 1904 the height of the dam was increased. Both of these actions were taken with the explicit consent of the United States. As a result of the dam, and also partly
as a result of natural causes, Lake Ontario overflowed its banks
in 1951-52 and caused damage to property owners in the United
States.
Here again, the Tribunal was not interested in proof of fault
but only in proof that the damage was caused by the construction
15 8
of Gut Dam. 1 5 7 This evidence sufficed to hold Canada liable.
It is therefore clear that the decision in the Gut
Dam arbitration
159
was also based upon a concept of strict liability.
Summary
The survey of the international judicial decisions relevant
in the context of this article reveals that there is a common judicial
understanding as to the applicability of the concept of strict liability
for transboundary or, to use the broader term, transjurisdictional
damage.
Such common understanding merits consideration as a
strong indicator that the concept of strict liability is the generally
appropriate regime to govern the occurrence of transjurisdictional
damage .160
e.

5.

United States ex gratia Payments

I should like to conclude the discussion of the sources of
international law as related to the notion of strict liability with a
brief mention of the United States ex gratia payments to Japan
as a consequence of damage suffered by Japanese fishermen as a
result of nuclear tests carried out by the United States at the Pacific
Proving 1Grounds in the Marshall Islands during March and April of
1954.0'

Following an exchange of notes, the United States agreed to
pay $2 million to the Japanese government on the understanding
157. See Schneider, supra note 144, at 50, 165.66.
158. Decision of Jan. 15, 1968, transcript at 589, reprinted in 8 Int'l
Legal Materials 118 at 136 (1969).
159. See Schneider, supra note 144, at 50, 16566.
160. See Goldie, supra note 32, at 1280.81; Goldie, supra note 19, at
306-07. Schneider, supra note 144, at 49; Kelsen, supra note 57, at 225; and
Teclaff, supro note 144, at 121, arrive at essentially the same conclusion.
161. For an account of the event, see Goldie, supra note 32, at notes
152-62 and accompanying text.
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that the sum would be distributed in an equitable manner to the
injured parties. 1 6 2 The United States agreed to do this despite a
lack of fault on its part, acting on a feeling of moral obligation
that mandated 3that damage suffered by innocent parties should be
16
compensated.
This payment certainly does not, in itself, point to an acceptance of the doctrine of strict liability in international law, but it can
nevertheless be used as a small piece of evidence in this regard. 1 6 4
C.

Evaluation

Having examined the sources of international law with respect
to the principle of strict liability, one is tempted to conclude that
there is ample evidence to support the view that the state, itself, is
directly responsible for transboundary pollution damage resulting
from an abnormally dangerous activity.
Yet such a view is tantamount to imposing an additional international obligation on states' discretion to act freely within the
limits of their national jurisdiction. It thus places a further restriction on the exercise of state sovereignty. As states can never
their sovereignty, the premise
be assumed to voluntarily curtail
165
must always be to the contrary.
This "obstacle" will have to be kept in mind if one is to establish a rule of customary international law which both conforms to
reality and is acceptable to the international community.
The task, therefore, is to crystallize a rationale for explaining
why the concept of strict liability has been applied and agreed upon
in certain cases and to find out whether a justifiable argument can
be made for the extension of this concept to a new and somewhat
analogous situation. This becomes even more crucial where the
concept in question appears to be an exception to an established
doctrine; i.e., in our case, it is the concept of strict liability which
constitutes a departure from the traditional concept of fault based
on the proof of either intent or negligence.
The proof of such deviating rule and its application to a situation where states have not yet dealt with on the basis of an overall
international agreement would, actually, seem to be justified only
162. Id. at 1233.
163. Id. at 1232.33; Schneider,supra note 144, at 167.
164. Id.; Goldie, supra note 32, at 1231 n. 153, 1233.
165. Doehring, Gewohnheitsrecht aus Vertragen, 36 Zeitschrift fur
auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 77 at 86 (1976).
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to the needs and interests of the community of
if it conformed
16 6
nations.
The foregoing has briefly pointed out the background based
on which an evaluation of the elements of customary international
law must be carried out in order to find a valid response to the
problem at stake. It seems to be appropriate to sum up briefly the
sources which have been examined so far.
These are: multilateral treaties on civil aviation, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the exploration and exploitation of outer
space, vessel-source pollution and the regional offshore convention;
declarations and resolutions; international judicial decisions; and,
finally, the United States' ex gratiapayments.
The opinions of writers will be taken into consideration in
the course of evaluating the other three elements of customary
international law.
1.

Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities
All the international conventions which have been cited impose
strict liability for the damage which occurs directly from the activity
described in the respective convention.
None of these activities is considered unlawful. To the contrary,
they are not only lawful, but also benefit society and are therefore
desired. The imposition of strict liability, the exonerations which
can be made and the limitations on the amount of liability (with the
exception of the Outer Space Convention, which does not allow a
limitation on liability for damage caused on the earth's surface) vary
in degree but contain essentially the same pattern.
Where does this pattern derive from, and how can the concept
of strict liability be explained and reasonably upheld? The concept
of strict liability or liability without fault1 6 7 was introduced more
than a century
ago in the famous English case Rylands v.
68
Fletcher.1

In that case, the defendants, who were owners of a mill, had
built a large water reservoir on their property for their own business
purposes. It was perfectly lawful for them to do so. They had the
construction of the reservoir carried out with all reasonable and

166. Id.
167. Both expressions are and may be used interchangeably.
168. 3 H & C 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865), rev'd, L.R. I Ex. 265
(1866), rev'd L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).

1980]

State Responsibility

due care under the supervision of an engineer and other competent
contractors. Unfortunately, due to the unknown and unexpected
presence of an old mine shaft, the water leaked out of the reservoir
and flooded the tunnels in the plaintiff's mine, located on the
adjacent property.
The plaintiff sued to recover damages caused by the flooding
of the mine, and the case was eventually decided in his favor by
the English House of Lords. The mill owners were held liable withto the neighbor's property by
out fault 1 6 9 for the damage caused
170
the accidentally escaped water.
The underlying principle for that decision was that the mill
owners had put their land to a "non-natural use" by collecting an
unusual amount of water, and that they, therefore, created an
extraordinary risk of harm in the conduct of their business. This
rendered them liable merely because damage was caused to the
neighbor's property.
It is worthwhile to note the similarity between this case and
the occurrence of oil spillage resulting from the lawful and careful
conduct of an offshore activity. The notions of "non-natural use"
of the land and the extraordinary risk of harm inherent in such use
were later absorbed in the notion of an "abnormally dangerous
activity" involving strict liability as applied in Rylands v. Fletcher.
The notion of an "abnormally dangerous activity" has also been
In the Restatement
adopted by various American states. 1 7 1
(Second) of Torts an attempt was undertaken to outline the criteria
and enumerate the factors to be considered in the determination of
whether an activity is "abnormally dangerous":
(a) Whether the activity involves a high degree of risk of
harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) Whether the gravity of the harm which may result from
it is likely to be great;
(c) Whether the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise
of reasonable care;
(d) Whether the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) Whether the activity is inappropriate to the place where
it is carried on; and

169. L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 278 (1866).
170. See also Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. Cin. L. Rev. 587, at 64243 (1969); Goldie, supra note 30, at 1208.
171. See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, 505-10, especially at 509 (4th
ed. 1971).
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1 72
(f) The value of the activity to the community.
These factors give a reasonable idea of what conditions will
render an activity "abnormally dangerous."' 1 73
Most of these
activities are products of new industrial and technological development and are, albeit their high degree of risk, generally both desired
by society and beneficial to it. They often increase the standard
of living and also enable a society to keep pace with international
economic competition. The further development of peaceful uses
of nuclear energy, for instance, may render a society independent
from foreign sources of energy. Who should, therefore, bear the
burden of risk: the people who are exposed to the risks inherent
in such an activity but also benefit from it, or rather the one who
introduces the abnormally dangerous activity? The question is
thus reduced to one of risk and loss distribution.
If, for instance, damage resulted from such an activity although
the activity was carried out with all reasonable and possible care,
the application of the traditional fault doctrine would be tantamount
to a denial of recovery for damages. The burden of risk would then
be borne by third parties because no fault could be proven. Even
if there were fault involved, it is possible that the injured party
would not be able to prove fault.
Such a result would be inadequate and inequitable; it should
be borne in mind that the one who introduces the risks, normally the
industry, is financially more capable of absorbing the burden of
liability since it also gets the profit out of the activity.
Strict liability, then, is necessary to avoid these inadequate
and inequitable results. Furthermore, the imposition of strict liability will help ensure that the activity is carried out with the greatest
of care.
Strict liability is justified only if it is applied to abnormally
dangerous activities, 1 7 - which by their very nature carry an extraordinary risk. And, in fact, this approach, the imposition of strict
liability on abnormally dangerous activities, has been generally
adopted in the domestic law of the world community. 1 75 Thus,

172. Restatement (Second) of Torts §520 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
173. For a discussion of activities which have been considered abnormally dangerous and therefore subjected to strict liability, see Katz, supra
note 170, at 641.
174. Id.
175. A comparative study of the application of the concept of strict
liability for abnormally dangerous activities goes beyond the framework of
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the standard of strict liability as applied to abnormally dangerous
activities seems to have brought about a new "common law of
nations."
The technological advances and modern processes involving
exceptional risks do not stop at national frontiers but transcend
this has led to an international concern with transnational
them, and
17 6
damage.
In fact, the increasing amount of abnormally dangerous activities of international scale and the likelihood of transjurisdictional
damage have clearly heightened the international concern with this
problem. 1 7 7 These activities have been defined as acts which result
in
a substantial change in the natural environment
of the earth or another State, significant pollution of the air or water, the release of nuclear
or other sources of energy liable to escape from
human control, disturbance of the equilibrium
of geophysical forces and pressures, the modification of biological processes, the creation of
automata, a major error of which may be irsuch sources
reparable, and impact damage from
17 8
as aircraft in flight and spacecraft.
Since-it has become obvious that the only appropriate standard
of liability for abnormally dangerous activities is a standard of strict
liability, states have tended to approach the subject matter on the
international scale the same way as in their domestic laws. Thus,
as a response to the threat of transnational damage, the international
community has, on the international scale, abandoned the traditional
concept of fault liability with respect to various abnormally dangerous activities and has introduced the concept of strict liability
instead.
This has been done expressly in the fields of civil aviation
this paper. For such a study, see Kelson, supra note 47, at 201-11; see also
Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community, 140 Recueils des
Cours 1, at 180 (1974-IV); and Jiminez de Ardchaga, supra note 33, at 538.
176. SeeJenks, supra note 49,at 195.
177. Fortunately, mankind has not yet experienced a disastrous nuclear
accident. Yet the Three Mile Island incident, an officially unreported incident
in the Urals (U.S.S.R.) and a series of minor incidents serve as indicators of
the enormous danger inherent in such activities.
178. See Jenks, supra note 49, at 195.

N.Y.J. Intl & Comp. L.

[Vol. II

(third party damage on the surface), the peaceful use of nuclear
energy, vessel-source pollution, and, on a regional basis, in the
field of exploration and exploitation of oil and gas on the Continental Shelf.
Such responses were necessary to avoid serious injustice and
hardship to third parties who are exposed to the risk inherent in
abnormally dangerous activities. 1 79 The categories of strict liability
as applied in the conventions vary with respect to the exonerations
which can be made and to the amount to which the liability may
be restricted corresponding to the degree of risk of the abnormally
dangerous activities.
The same understanding of the imposition of strict liability
appears to have been adopted by Principle 21 of the Declaration
on the Human Environment of the United Nations Conference in
Stockholm and reaffirmed by the United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions 2995 and 2996, which impose responsibility for the
causation of transnational damage rather than for a wrongful act or
omission. It is also reflected in the United States ex gratia payments
to Japan.
As far as the opinion of writers and scholars is concerned,
the theory of risk as opposed to the concept of fault received early
attention. 1 8 0 Today the necessity of strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities is generally acknowledged and accepted. 18 1
It can also be considered that the necessity for the application
of strict liability for certain activities has
been accepted in the work
18 2
of the International Law Commission.
179. Id., at 107.
180. See,. e.g., the report by the Institut de Droit International in
Annuaire de l'Institute de Droit International 103.06 (1927 III).
181. See, e.g., Goldie, supra note 19, at 306; Goldie, supra note 32,
at 1196, 1224; Jimdnez de Arichaga, supra note 33, at 53840; Hardy, Nuclear
Liability: The General Principles of Law and Further Proposals, 36 Brit. Y.B.
Intl L. 223 at 227 (1960);Jenks, supra note 49, at 105; Randelzhofer & Simma,
supra note 46, at 429-3 1; Mosler, supra note 175, at 180-82; Schneider, supra
note 144, at 163.
182. See Summary Records of the lOllth Meeting, [1969] I Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 107,
10, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1969; Summary Records
of the 1012th Meeting, id. at 110,
10, 17; Summary Records of the 1013th
Meeting, id. at 114, 8; Summary Records of the 1075th Meeting, [1970] I
Y.B. Intl L. Comm'n 185, 40, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1970; Summary
Records of the 1076th Meeting, id. at 190, 31; Second Report on State Responsibility, U.N. GAOR A/CN. 4/233, [1970] II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 177
at 186,
28, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1970/Add. 1; Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR A/8010/Rev.
1, [1970] II Y.B. Intl L. Comm'n 221 at 306, 66(b), 307-08, 74, U.N.
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This is of enormous weight since the work of the I.L.C. enjoys
a considerably higher authority and persuasiveness than the ordinary
writings of publicists in that it not only represents states' opinion
but also reflects18 3the collective effort of an official body of the
United Nations.
Giving due respect to this overwhelming evidence of the acceptance of the concept of strict liability in municipal laws and in the
sources of international law alike, we must conclude that the concept of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity is now
firmly established in customary international law.
The Question of Limitation of Liability
The conventions, except for the Outer Space Convention,
have made it possible for the operator to limit his liability. A prime
reason is that the activities described in these conventions are normally introduced and carried out by private initiative which would
be deterred if the amount of liability were unlimited. 18 4 The limitations served as a quid pro quo for the imposition of liability.
Second, the maximum amount of liability was made dependent
on the insurability of the risk.
The maximum amount, however, seems to vary corresponding
to the degree of risk and to the time of agreement 1 85 and is, therefore, particularly suited to a convention. 18 6 In general international
law, a standardized limit can hardly be established. 1 8 7 The amount
to which an operator will be held liable, therefore, has to be
limited by means of reasonableness in the light of the particular
circumstances, 1 8 8 as is the case in any dispute regarding the amount
of compensation where a limit on liability has not been previously
established by statute, precedent or the parties themselves.
2.

Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1970/Add. 1.
183. See Amerasinghe, supra note 141, at 32.
184. See Brown, supra note 72, at 420-21. This, however, is not necessarily true, as one study reveals; see Fleischer, Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
Resulting from Offshore Operations, 20 Scand. Studies in Law 105 at 116-17
(1976).
185. See Kelson, supra note 47, notes 214-16 and accompanying text;
see also 3enks, supra note 49, at 185-86.
186. See Kelson, supra note 47, notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
187. Id.
188. See Jenks, supra note 49, at 186; Fleischer, supra note 184, at 124.
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Strict Liability as Applied to Offshore Activities

Having thus examined the standards governing the liability for
abnormally dangerous activities and having established the concept
of strict liability as a well-founded principle of customary international law, the fundamental question arises as to whether it can
be applied to the exploration and exploitation of oil on the continental shelf as well.
The recent developments in this area have been pointed out in
the introduction to this paper. The introduction has also undertaken
to outline the enormous amount of oil pollution of the oceans and
the probability and risk of well blowouts, as well as the scope of
harm resulting from such oil pollution. The facts are crushing. They
have also been outlined by the President's Panel on Oil Spills. 18 9
This must necessarily lead to the conclusion that oil and gas
exploration and exploitation on the continental shelf bear all the
characteristics and factors justifying their being regarded as abnormally dangerous activities.
Consequently, all damages resulting
from these activities should be governed by the concept of strict
liability as established in international law.
A state might find its own way of apportioning the risk arising
from such activity among its citizens. But on the international scale
it is impossible to allow such activity to be carried out at the expense
of other states. Thus, the application of strict liability to these activities is no longer questioned, as recent developments indicate, e.g., the
Regional Offshore Convention of the North Sea Coastal States. The
IMCO Convention on vessel-source pollution has also shown dearly
enough that the community of nations is ready to impose strict liability on activities which are likely to result in marine oil pollution.
Hence, the imposition of strict liability on the oil exploration
and exploitation of the continental shelf has also been strongly
19 0
postulated and overwhelmingly supported by scholars.

189. See note 22 and accompanying text, supra.
190. See Jenks, supra note 49, at 158-59; Kelson, supra note 47, at
229-30; Schneider, supra note 144, at 170; Fleischer, supra note 184, at 108
et passim; Katz, supra note 170, at 642-43 et passim; Goldie, supra note 32, at
1218; Goldie, Liability for Oil PollutionDisasters: InternationalLaw and the
Delimitation of Competences in a FederalPolicy, 6 J. Mar. L. & Com. 303 at
310 (1975). B. A. Dubois maintains the view that the risk of marine oil pollution due to a well blowout is less than the risk of pollution caused.by tanker
accidents. See Dubois, supra note 129, at 76. This view cannot be maintained
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State Responsibility and Strict Liability

The last topic to be considered is how the concept of strict
liability for abnormally dangerous activities can be related to the
responsibility of states.
a.

Civil and InternationalLiability
The only convention to impose strict liability on the state
itself is the Space Liability Convention. According to Article II,
the state is internationally and strictly liable for any damage caused
by a space object on the surface regardless of the public or private
nature of the enterprise which launched it.
The state is responsible in the first instance. The traditional
concept of state responsibility is abandoned in that responsibility
is imposed on a lawful activity regardless of fault. The traditional
requirements of the law of state responsibility, i.e., fault and the
existence of a wrongful act or omission, need no longer be met.
Also, even if the activity is carried out by a private individual, the
state will be automatically and directly rendered liable.
Unlike the Space Liability Convention, the other conventions
focus on the civil liability of the private operator. However, the
responsibility of the state is unquestioned if the activity is carried
out by the state itself, i.e., if the state itself is the operator. It is also
plain that the state will be internationally liable if it does notaccording to its obligation visii-vis the other contracting parties-19 1
implement the provisions of the conventions domestically.
Yet this does not solve our problem.
It should be borne in mind that the states which agree on
the implementation of the concept of strict civil liability in an international convention do so by "putting themselves 'in the shoes' of
a national legislator." 19 2 A convention thus agreed upon is, therefore, no more, but also no less, than a unification of municipal
and is disproved by recent events: the Gulf of Mexico has just experienced the
worst oil spill in world history, a spill caused by a blowout. Other such
incidents have already been discussed, and statistics reveal a high probability of
well blowouts. The view espoused by Dubois, who obviously appears to support

a less stringent standard for offshore activities on the continental shelf, must,
therefore, be rejected.
191. See Kelson,supra note 47, at 237.
192. Arangio-Ruiz, Some International Legal Problems of the Civil Uses

of Nuclear Energy, 107 Recueils des Cours 503 at 629 (1962 III).
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laws with regard to a certain subject-matter. As such, states have
in these instances created a uniform common law 19 3 as a legal
response to abnormally dangerous activities resulting from the
advancement of technology, industry, and science.
Since states wanted the respective subject-matters to be
governed by civil liability, it indicates that the states, albeit feeling
the need for a regime of strict liability, did not intend to become
involved themselves, i.e., to assume direct responsibility.
Yet it can be contemplated that there is a shift toward the
international liability of states corresponding to the increase in
the degree of risk of abnormally dangerous activities.
In aviation hazards, the liability is primarily that of the
operator. Nuclear hazards are an intermediate
case. Space hazards
19 4
states.
of
responsibility
the
become
clearly
In this context, the unification of rules regarding strict liability
along with corresponding provisions in the various municipal laws
clearly constitutes a general
principle of law as defined in Article
195
381(c) of the ICJ Statute.
As such, they do not lead directly to the international liability
of states, but they do, indeed, formulate the concept of strict civil
liability, the application and imposition of which is the duty of
any state which allows abnormally dangerous activities to be carried
out within its jurisdiction.
In light of this, the state cannot be held responsible in the
first instance-unless the activities are carried out by itself-for
transnational or transjurisdictional damage resulting from abnormally dangerous activities carried out by private individuals or
juridical persons. It is, however, its duty to ensure that, should
such an event occur, 19
the
injured parties are allowed redress on the
6
basis of strict liability.
If the state, therefore, falls short of this obligation, it will
be responsible itself for the activities carried out within its jurisdiction which cause damage beyond national jurisdiction. This
seems appropriate when one takes into consideration the strong share
of states in such activities. 19 7 They are licensed and heavily con193. See Jenks, supra note 49,at 178-79.
194. Id.
195. See Randelzhofer & Simma, supra note 56, at 428.
196. See art. 7 of the Vienna Convention; art. 3(a) of the Brussels Convention; the OEEC Convention, Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 90 and
accompanying text; art. 111(2) of the Nuclear Ship Convention.
197. See Jenks, supra note 49, at 191.
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trolled by the states, and carried out for their benefit.
Thus, a state is no longer capable of exonerating itself from
the ultimate duty to compensate by proving that there was no
fault involved in a given transnational or transjurisdictional damagecausing incident, and no state therefore, is allowed to benefit
at the expense of other societies.198
b.

State Responsibility and UNCLOS III

What is the impact of the work of UNCLOS III if we are to
deal with the transjurisdictional oil pollution damage resulting
from the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf?
The work of UNCLOS III has not yet come to a vote. The
outcomes of the various issues in the respective committees -are
compiled in the Draft Convention.1 9 9 As such, the Draft Convention
represents the consent to date of the participating countries on the
various issues.
Even if the provisions of the Draft Convention are not binding,
they nonetheless constitute a strong evidence of opinio juris. Article
235 Draft Convention deals with the responsibility and liability of
states. Article 235(1) reads as follows: "States are responsible for
the fulfillment of their international obligations concerning the
protection and preservation of the marine environment. They shall
be liable in accordance with international law."
Article 194(2) provides that:
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction and
control are so conducted that they do not cause
damage by pollution to other States and their
environment, and that pollution arising from
incidents or activities under their jurisdiction
or control does not spread beyond the areas
where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.
Article 194(2) makes it clear that such activity means, inter alia,
the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the
sea bed and subsoil, and therefore also the continental shelf. This
part of the Draft Convention apparently imposes a strong obligation
on the prospective member states with regard to precautionary
measures for the prevention of marine pollution.
198. See Kelson, supra note 47, at 237.
199. See note 20, supra.
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If one were to interpret the meaning of Article 194(2) in
isolation, it could be taken to mean that the occurrence of transjurisdictional marine pollution damage from the described activity
implies a state's failure to comply with the requirement of the
Article, in that such an event evidences that the state could not
have taken all necessary measures to prevent the damage. Such
an interpretation would imply that states have agreed to assume
absolute responsibility with respect to the prevention of marine
pollution.
While, in the writer's opinion, such an interpretation would
produce desirable results, this reading of Article 194(2) is unwarranted. Any treaty or convention should be interpreted so that
its provisions do not contradict each other, and Article 235(2)
provides that: "states shall ensure that recourse is available in
accordance with their legal system for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in respect of damage by pollution of the
marine environment by natural or juridical persons under their
jurisdiction."
The first interpretation of Article 235(1) in connection with
Article 194(2) would render Article 235(2) superfluous because
the state would be liable in the first instance. If that were the case,
national legislation in accordance with Article 235(2) would be
irrelevant. This can be neither the intent of the draftsmen nor
the result of a reasonable interpretation. Article 194(2) can, therefore, only be interpreted to mean that states must take all reasonable
measures to prevent pollution from the described activity. If transjurisdictional damage is nevertheless done, the natural or juridical
person who carried out the activity will be responsible in the first
instance. [Article 235(2).] Such responsibility, nonetheless, does
not preclude the state's ultimate responsibility if it fails to guarantee
that prompt and adequate compensation be paid. [Articles 235(1),
194(2), in connection with Article 235(2).] As has been concluded
above, such compensation would have to be based, in the event of
transjurisdictional pollution, on the concept of strict liability.
Such an interpretation avoids contradictions, does not render Article
235(2) futile and must therefore be given preference. This interpretation also conforms to what was found in the other sources
of international law.
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Part III
Conclusion
The response of international law to the question of liability
for transjurisdictional oil pollution damage resulting from the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf and the categories
of liability, which shall be applied will be summarized briefly.
First, one who undertakes oil exploration and exploitation
activities is strictly liable for the transjurisdictional oil-pollution
damage resulting from such activity.
Second, "strictly liable" means, in this context, liable without
proof of fault, regardless of the lawfulness of the activity in
question.
Third, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties involved, the
liability is limited only by a standard of reasonableness.
Fourth, the state will be held indirectly liable under the above
standards if it fails to ensure that adequate and prompt compensation or other relief will be given to the injured parties.
Fifth, the state will be directly responsible if it carries out
the activity itself.
The advantage of this solution is that it is realistic in that
it corresponds to the needs and interests of society. It is acceptable
to and accepted by the states as has been noted. And it is appropriate that the ultimate responsibility rests on the states because
these activities are carried out under the states' jurisdiction. The
states license, promulgate standards of safety, and control the
activities as well as reap the benefits.
Further, since coastal states have promoted and emphasized
their own interests in the UNCLOS III negotiations, it is only fair
that they should bear the burden of ultimate responsibility for
abnormally dangerous activities which are carried out under their
jurisdiction over the continental shelf. Some writers are even of the
opinion that the state is always responsible for transnational or
transjurisdictional damage resulting from any sort of abnormally
dangerous activities. 2 0 0 This approach is certainly highly desirable:
the alternatives of requiring plaintiffs to exhaust local remedies
is burdensome and may be inappropriate in many cases of trans-

200. See, e.g., Kelson, supra note 29, at 229-33.
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boundary pollution, especially when large numbers of people have
suffered damage. 2 0 1 These people are clearly better protected if
they are represented in such a case by the state. 20 2 Class actions,
which are available in the United States, may not be provided for in
other legal systems. In the absence of such a provision, a single
litigant may be de facto denied justice because of the prohibitive cost
of legal representation in a foreign jurisdiction. Unfortunately, no
universal legal framework provides for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. Further, the operator of the damaging
activity might not have assets in the country of the complainant's
residence. It might therefore not be practical to sue the operator in
that country. It has been said that:
[T] he normal rule of international law that
local remedies must be exhausted before recourse to an international remedy is not inherently inapplicable in cases of ultra-hazardous
liability, especially where the liability is in the
first instance a civil liability of an operator
rather than an international liability of a State.
But when the hazard is of such a nature and
importance, and the government is so directly
involved in the operation, that the civil liability
of the operator is virtually merged in the international liability of the State, the rule loses its

practical justification. A theoretical case for
it can still be maintained on the grounds of
principle, but it ceases to be a useful practical

rule.203

There is truth in this, but the view that states are eo ipso directly
responsible can only be maintained as an argument de lege ferenda.

States generally are not yet prepared to ratify such an approach.
The Draft Convention provisions are the best example of modem
judicial opinion regarding state responsibility for pollution damage.
Applying the principles dicussed above to the Mexican Oil
Spill, it is clear that Pemex, as both a government-owned national
oil company and the actual operator, is strictly liable for the damage
done to United States territories as a result of the Ixtoc I well blow-

201. See Hoffman, supra note 143, at 513.
202. Id.
203. Jenks,supra note 49, at 191.
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out. Because of the well-established principle of international law
that states cannot claim sovereign rights in cases of acta jure gestionis,20 4 Pemex could also be sued in the United States. Regardless of where jurisdiction is bound, however, Pemex's liability is
clear.

204. "Acta jure gestionis" is to mean cases where a state embarks upon
commercial activities which could also be carried out by private natural or
juridical persons. See Verdross & Simma, supra note 33, at 565, for a discussion
of this concept.

